With entry into force of the Kyoto Protocol in 2005, climate change negotiators are turning their attention to the question, 'Where do we go from here?'. A key component of answering this question is in understanding the implications for society of alternative long-term goals for greenhouse gas concentrations. One challenge in ongoing negotiations is whether and how to deal with meanings of 'dangerous interference' as outlined in Article 2 of the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change. This study addresses Article 2 by suggesting the use of long-term goals to guide decisions about the stringency and timing of future climate change commitments. Focusing on mitigation policy benefits and, in particular, on avoiding long-term climate impacts, a number of management approaches and their implications are highlighted. After discussing some challenges of using scientific knowledge to monitor and manage progress, we look at what we can learn from current climate change global impact literature. Solid benchmark indicators appear to be available from global mean temperature change, ecosystems and coastal zone impacts information. We conclude by arguing for global goal-setting based on climate change effects and the use of indicators in these areas as part of post-2012 climate change negotiations. Aggregate global impacts suggest that 3-4°C of global mean temperature increase by 2100 (compared to a reference period of 1990) may be a threshold beyond which all known sector impacts are negative and rising with increasing levels of warming. However, marginal benefits may accrue at lower levels of mean change. Thus, a prudent policy might aim for significantly lower levels and slower rates of global warming.
Introduction
Article 2 of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC 1992) 1 focuses international effort on avoiding dangerous climate change and stabilizing atmospheric concentrations of greenhouse gases. In this light, the consideration of long-term goals to guide policy is not an option but an integral part of the Convention and of future negotiations. Yet a practical interpretation of Article 2 has so far eluded policymakers. Some observers have suggested there is a growing acceptance and political recognition that information about climate change impacts can help policymakers to interpret Article 2 (Oppenheimer and Petsonk, 2005; Yamin and Depledge, 2004; Corfee Morlot and Höhne, 2003; Metz et al., 2002; Berk et al., 2002) , while others remain more sceptical (e.g. Pershing and Tudela, 2003) . However, much of the research community, and the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change in particular, has avoided getting into this area, noting that it is the work of policymakers (rather than scientists and researchers) to balance different perspectives on risk, to value risk avoidance, and to make judgements about what is acceptable (IPCC 2001a; Agrawala, 1999) . 2 The formal political process of international climate negotiations under the Convention has also largely avoided the question of how to interpret Article 2 (Corfee Morlot and Höhne, 2003; Depledge, 2000) . 3 Meanwhile several national governments have made hortatory statements about long-term objectives for climate policies; e.g. the Netherlands and, more recently, Germany and Canada (for a detailed, historical account, see Oppenheimer and Petsonk, 2005) . In 2005, the EU formally reaffirmed its view on the Convention objective by stating that global mean temperature should not exceed a 2°C increase above pre-industrial levels (EU, 2004 (EU, , 2005 . In an effort to influence an upcoming G-8 ministerial, a multilateral task force of prominent scientists and policymakers recently recommended the establishment of the same long-term temperature change goal as a guide for further policy actions (ICCT, 2005) . These actions demonstrate an ongoing political interest in some countries, regions and among some communities of experts to interpret the Convention's objective in a practical way. However, given the global nature of the climate change problem, none of these efforts will have political implications for next steps under the Convention unless relevant issues are also addressed in a wider multilateral context. 4 This article explores the possibility of using long-term goals as a guide for post-2012 climate policy. It focuses on global mitigation decisions and considers long-term climate goals in the form of impacts (or proxies for impacts) that society might wish to avoid. Such goals could be used to outline desirable global emission pathways of acceptable stringency and sufficient timing to significantly limit the risk of key impacts (Figures 1  and 2 ). For example, distinct pathways emerge for 450 and 550 ppm CO 2 stabilization objectives ( Figure  2 ) and each corresponds to a different set of risks for climate change and impact outcomes. While still not providing insights on important questions related to post-2012 climate negotiations, such as allocation of responsibilities for mitigation among different Parties, forms of commitment, or instruments for implementation, a general agreement on long-term goals would provide input with respect to level of ambition and upper bounds for emission pathways for any future agreement.
This article focuses narrowly on the implications of our current knowledge of climate change impacts for the stringency and timing mitigation commitments. After a brief review of recent IPCC findings of relevance, it is organized into four parts, addressing the following questions: • What are the main challenges to advancing a policy discourse on Article 2? • How might we use current knowledge, including the global climate impacts literature, to guide interpretation of Article 2?
In particular, what types of climate change impacts (or metrics for impacts) might be used to guide policy decisions on both mitigation and, to some extent, priorities for adaptation? • Are there transferable frameworks/approaches from other environmental regimes that emphasize decision-making targets based on adverse impacts? • How might information on impacts be better used to assist in the post-2012 climate change negotiations, advance policy decisions, and review progress towards achievement of Article 2?
Advancing policy discourse on Article 2: some analytical challenges
The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) has offered some insights into how one might monitor progress towards Article 2. On the question of the benefits of mitigation, the IPCC concluded that 'comprehensive, quantitative estimates of the benefits of stabilization at various levels of atmospheric greenhouse gases do not yet exist' (IPCC, 2001a, p. 102) .
A range of different perspectives on the benefits of stabilization were expressed by Smith et al. (2001) in the IPCC summary chapter on impacts. On economic benefits, they summarized literature containing aggregate monetized estimates deriving from integrated assessment exercises, representing gains or losses in global gross domestic product associated with different levels of global mean temperature increase from 1990 (IPCC, 2001c, pp. 943-944, Fig. 19-4) . Unfortunately such estimates have a number of important shortcomings: some of these studies ignore significant ecosystem and amenity values or other non-market impacts of climate change; they exclude treatment of the risk of non-linear, abrupt change or shifts in climate variability with implications for extreme climate events.
5 Furthermore, the various authors may use quite different regional aggregation approaches, baselines, and valuation assumptions that drive outcomes, even when controlling for discount rate assumptions. Overall, the results of aggregate studies must be interpreted with much caution because they are few in number, they build on an impacts literature that is not comprehensive in its study of potential impacts, and because they either omit potentially critical impacts or make sweeping assumptions in order to include such impacts. The bottom line is that aggregate damage costs are incomplete at best and need significantly more research before we can have confidence in any of these estimates for policy assessment purposes. 6 Smith et al. (2001) also provided the policy community with another vision of how one might consider impacts in a comprehensive manner (IPCC, 2001c, pp. 917-959, Fig. 19-7) using a variety of different metrics -economic and non-economic -for assessment of risks across different 'levels of climate change'. They outline five 'reasons for concern': risks to unique and threatened systems; risks from extreme climate events; distribution of impacts; aggregate impacts; and risks from future large-scale discontinuities. These suggest the use of a range of different metrics and benchmark indicators of 'key vulnerabilities' to work within and across sector impact categories, to further develop a means to monitor change. Eventually such indicators could be used to assess the performance of different mitigation strategies.
Mitigation aside, some amount of human-induced climate change is inevitable, particularly through to 2050, but also beyond 2050. This is due to the long time lag between reductions in emissions, changes in atmospheric concentrations, and thus impacts. A sense of what may be already 'locked in' to the bio-geophysical system can be taken from the range of global mean temperature projections found in the literature (IPCC, 2001a (IPCC, , 2001b Hare and Meinshausen, 2004) . Looking across the full range of IPCC scenarios, we see a relatively narrower range of temperature changes predicted in the 2000-2025 and 2025-2050 time frames compared with 2050-2100 (Allen et al., 2001; IPCC, 2001a) . This indicates that mitigation action is likely to have relatively limited effects on nearer-term climatic change. Limiting climate change impacts in the short term will require adaptations to address current (socio-economic) vulnerabilities and efforts to avoid mal-adaptations to climate change (OECD, 2003a (OECD, -d, 2004a Klein, 2001) .
Policymakers could make better use of the climate change impacts literature if it were organized around time frames that can be mapped to policy responses. Near-term and unavoidable impacts require immediate adaptation attention, whereas longer-term impacts can be avoided through mitigation and/or altered by adaptation. A better framing of impact literature -both into relevant time frames and into a limited set of benchmark indicators of key vulnerabilities or thresholdscould thus enhance the value of impacts information for use in the mitigation policy decisionmaking. The remainder of this article explores this possibility, expanding upon the IPCC's use of multiple-metrics and 'reasons for concern' as a way forward to elaborate the benefits of mitigation policy as an input to goal-setting for global mitigation. We build on a recent proposal by Jacoby (2004; see Box 1) as well as other recent efforts in this area (OECD, 2004c; Corfee Morlot and Agrawala, 2004; Patwardhan et al., 2003; ECF and PIK, 2004; UK Defra, 2005) , to begin to carefully consider the links between avoided climate change impacts and possible post-2012 mitigation efforts.
Use of Article 2 to guide decisions and monitor progress
Broad uncertainty may explain the lack of attention in the negotiations to the interpretation of Article 2 and long-term goals of climate policies. Uncertainty complicates such an interpretation, especially since the risks of accelerated climate change will play out over decades or even centuries. There is also a disconnect between the location of mitigation action and the location of where policy benefits occur. As impacts are a function of changes in physical climate and socio-economic conditions (including vulnerability and the ability to deal with climate change), the principal benefits of mitigation policies are not likely to accrue to those who mitigate most. Despite these problems, some guidance on how to approach monitoring or 'operationalization' of the Convention objective is found in Article 2 itself, which outlines three key vulnerabilities to guide decisions: stabilization should be achieved in a time frame (i) to avoid threatening food production, (ii) to allow ecosystems to adapt naturally, and (iii) to enable economic development to proceed in a sustainable manner.
The three vulnerabilities mentioned in Article 2 may be considered benchmark impact areas against which progress through international cooperation can be monitored. Although monitoring progress in this way has not yet occurred, it may be an appropriate time to begin. Such a 'stock taking' may be a valuable starting point for new negotiations on post-2012 commitments, especially if those negotiations are to include a broad understanding of implications of their choices for long-term outcomes or impacts. The notion of key vulnerabilities or thresholds in different time frames may provide insights. Consistent with the Jacoby proposal (Box 1), two basic approaches to understanding key vulnerabilities are discussed here: 'top-down' approaches using global proxies for climate change, and 'bottom-up' approaches using regional impact assessments and information.
'Top-down' thresholds to structure assessment and guide decisions
One possible proxy for global climate change impacts in mitigation analysis is global mean temperature change (Jacoby, 2004) . Characterization of impacts as a function of global mean temperature increase 7 could facilitate review of mitigation options and of trade-offs among different strategies with respect to climate change impacts and costs (Jacoby, 2004; Hitz and Smith, 2004; Corfee Morlot and Agrawala, 2004) . This is because global mean temperature increase will vary directly with changes in atmospheric concentrations of GHG. In this way, global mean temperature increase (over a common base year period) can be a means to compare the implications of different 'levels of climate change' over time. Recent literature has begun to quantify uncertainties in GHG emission projections and climate predictions (Webster et al., 2003; Jones, 2004; Wigley, 2004a and 2004b; Wigley and Raper, 2001 ). These probabilistic assessments could be a useful guide to establishing upper bounds for global emissions or 'emission envelopes' for future mitigation decisions.
9
Through the use of probability distribution functions, one can look at the likelihood of exceeding a particular global mean temperature change under different atmospheric stabilization outcomes or Jacoby (2004) proposes a portfolio of different measures to provide a structure for current (incommensurable) information on avoided impact benefits of mitigation and future research. It starts with information on global physical variables which are characterized with quantified uncertainty ranges so as to cast the issue in risk reduction terms. A selection of global variables (e.g. mean temperature, perhaps by latitude or sea level) should be expressed in natural or physical units. This level of assessment would be free of valuation or aggregation controversies, as the information is reported separately by variable and in different physical units. A priority for research at this level would be on how to characterize and communicate with stakeholders on how to deal with different types of risk associated with different levels of climate change. Also at this global scale, at least qualitative characterization of abrupt, non-linear change should be included (e.g. Schneider and Lane 2004; Alley et al., 2003) .
A second set of information is the characterization of effects at regional scale. This might be mainly natural/physical units for non-market impacts and natural/physical units plus monetary estimates for market impacts where possible. A first step is to rethink the regional groupings to be used to structure the information. Ideally the structure would include only a few indices which would have high information content to a wide body of stakeholders. These should be clearly def ined and allow for independent assessment with global applicability (across regions), ultimately allowing for comparison across regions.
A third set of information is bottom-up, regional-scale non-market impact valuation and global aggregation which would allow valuation to proceed as methods and data allow. This leaves aggregation in the hands of the individual players, and provides clarity about different approaches to valuation, weighting and aggregation.
Source: Jacoby (2004).
across emission scenarios. In this approach the question for the policymaker becomes: What is the probability of exceeding a particular change in global mean temperature over 1990 levels (say 2-3°C) for one particular mitigation strategy versus another (Jones, 2004; see Figure 3 )? An Figure 3 . Probabilities of meeting temperature targets at given levels of CO 2 stabilization. For a given level of atmospheric CO 2 stabilization in the future, a range of climate variables (e.g. forcing constants and climate sensitivity) were varied. Jones (2004) performed uniform Monte Carlo sampling of these variables and then, using an equation detailed in his paper, calculated the stabilization temperature. alternative way to phrase the question is: What is the distribution of global mean temperature increase outcomes (and its most likely value and confidence interval), associated with any particular mitigation strategy (Webster et al., 2003; Jacoby, 2004 ; see Figure 4) ? 10 Approaches to answer either of these questions are likely to combine expert opinion and analytical modelling to derive likelihoods of the outcome in question through probabilistic assessment (e.g. Reilly et al., 2001; Allen et al., 2001; Pittock et al., 2001 ).
The top-down 'threshold' approach embedded in the first question presumes the existence of (and agreement of the policy community on) some upper bound of global mean temperature change which is to be prevented from occurring. A shortcoming of basing the assessment on such a physical threshold is that it could lead to the interpretation that prevention of lesser levels of change is not of value. However, an advantage is that it reveals clear differences in the substantive outcomes of one mitigation strategy versus another when taking into account recognized uncertainties.
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Figure 4. Temperature change under no-policy and 550 ppm GHG stabilization cases. Webster et al. (2003) produced this joint probability density function (PDF) by varying five areas of model parameters including climate sensitivity and future GHG emissions. Their model design is such that they can explore structural uncertainties of other models by varying these model parameters. The input PDFs were constructed using historical observations and expert elicitation, and were not uniform as Jones (2004) assumed. The policy case used by Webster et al. (2003) is equivalent to a 550 ppm stabilization scenario using the model's reference parameters. 
'Bottom-up' thresholds to structure assessment and guide decisions
Some authors have also advocated the use of 'bottom-up' impact thresholds to inform decisions about 'what is dangerous' under Article 2 of the Convention (Swart and Vellinga, 1994; Parry et al., 1996; O'Neill and Oppenheimer, 2002) . Although this concept has undoubtedly influenced the policy debate in the past, it has not had any tangible negotiating outcome (Corfee Morlot and Höhne, 2003; Oppenheimer and Petsonk, 2005) .
12 One reason may be the lack of international consensus on a meaningful set of benchmark bottom-up indicators of global impacts on which one could establish thresholds and monitor progress. Clearly monitoring all impacts would be impractical, if not impossible; instead progress requires agreement on key impacts that are significant and meaningful to both specialist and non-specialist audiences in order to secure broad public support for action.
A second challenge with a bottom-up threshold concept is that many climate change risks and related thresholds are highly context-specific. This requires local or regional assessments of relevant factors, including vulnerability, coping ranges, historical variability and community risk preferences Jones, 2001) . Credible threshold assessment involves a complicated set of 'bottomup' tasks that would be difficult for international negotiators to grapple with directly. However such a 'bottom-up' effort could be commissioned and run in parallel with a formal negotiation to provide a robust base of information as well as greater awareness and support for action to limit climate change.
Despite the challenges, complementing the necessarily top-down negotiating approaches with bottom-up assessments and perspectives may provide a means to bring together over time the widely divergent interests of different negotiating groups around common avoided impact goals. Of course, agreement on a threshold at any scale (global, regional or local) will always require political judgement about what is acceptable and, presumably, this judgement will be grounded in evolving social understandings of climate change. In the case of climate change, the best that one could hope for is a clear indication from certain communities about what thresholds or key vulnerabilities are relevant to whom, which in turn could guide assessment of the performance of alternatives with respect to the identified key vulnerabilities. An example might be ensuring 80% stability in unique and climate-sensitive ecosystems such as Arctic ecosystems (e.g. tundra). An assessment of this key vulnerability could aim to identify benchmark metrics and thresholds, say for regional mean temperature increase or another proxy of global climate change, below which risk to ecosystem resilience is minimized.
Any use of 'bottom up' indicators of regional impacts of climate change, threshold identification or other forms of information gathering on local/regional risk perception would ideally involve an iterative dialogue and scientific assessment process, with engagement of stakeholders in the formulation of recommendations.
13 Some relevant experience may exist in climate change impact programmes already established in OECD countries or regions (e.g. in the UK and in the EU); however, in general, there is limited capacity and experience with the use of regional impact assessments to consider the implications of climate change mitigation strategies over the long term.
14 Including developing countries or other key emitters (e.g. Russia) with OECD nations in such efforts is a long-term agenda, yet one that may pay off by incrementally building support for strengthened mitigation action to limit climate change and its impacts.
At the moment negotiators may have a only a vague understanding of the risks of climate change, which form the basis for negotiating future mitigation commitments, especially with respect to arguments about stringency of commitments. 15 There may already be an important and rapidly growing base of knowledge about observed and predicted climate change impacts (e.g. in the Arctic region, in the Mediterranean, in high altitude mountain regions, and possibly coral reef areas and/or coastal zones). At a minimum, further work and dialogue with stakeholders in regions relevant to these impact areas could build on existing assessments to provide important insights for post-2012 negotiations and possibly provide a glimpse of the implications of alternative mitigation decisions on long-term impact outcomes.
Using current global impact literature to interpret Article 2
A recent OECD-led review of the global impacts literature from a mitigation perspective offers some insights about the differences between a world with global mean temperature increases of 2°C, 3°C or 4°C compared with 1990 levels; however, it also raises a number of questions and highlights gaps in our knowledge. Hitz and Smith (2004) reviewed the global impacts literature to assess the general shape of sector damage curves. They express globally aggregated impacts in particular sectors as a function of changes in global mean temperature (GMT) and in units used in the original studies (i.e. monetary and non-monetary). The analysis considers the magnitude of avoided damage benefits in going from one level of climate change to another. When considering the magnitude of damages, the question arises: Are changes in impacts constant, decreasing, increasing, or do they change in sign (from negative to positive) at some point?
The authors conclude that sector damages can be plotted as function of GMT increase -although levels of confidence vary. Damages relationships vary across sectors, however, and these sector variations may provide insights into key vulnerabilities and thus help to guide effective policy responses. Finally, in a number of areas there are no global studies, so our understanding of global impacts remains partial at best. Hitz and Smith (2004) divided sector damage curves into three categories ( Figure 5 ):
• 'parabolic' in shape (decreasing initially, shifting to increase with more significant climate change) • increasing with climate change • indeterminate.
Results showed a parabolic relationship for agriculture, terrestrial ecosystem productivity and forestryreflecting a positive CO 2 fertilization effect on plant growth at lower levels of warming. At higher temperatures, however, aggregate damages emerge as optimal growing temperatures are exceeded and warmer (sometimes drier) conditions lead to evaporative loss of humidity in soils, thus limiting plant growth. 16 In a number of other sectors -coastal zones, health, marine ecosystems, biodiversityimpacts are negative even at lower levels of global warming. Thus these sectors are likely to be among the most sensitive to climate change at the lowest levels of global warming. Finally, in a number of important sectors -such as water, energy, and aggregated costs across all impacts -the relationship is simply unknown (due to an insufficient number of studies).
No sector results suggest positive impacts from climate change as mean temperatures increase beyond several degrees. Thus global aggregate marginal benefits of mitigation clearly exist beyond global mean temperature increases of 3-4°C (compared with 1990 levels). Though marginal benefits are likely to accrue at even lower levels than 3-4°C, the literature is somewhat ambiguous, especially in key market sectors such as agriculture and forestry. For ecosystems and for coastal zones, however, marginal benefits will accrue when moving below 3-4°C to no change in climate (from 1990 levels).
What are the policy relevant implications from this survey of global impacts literature? How can such literature help us define 'dangerous interference' as outlined by Article 2? In the agriculture area, evidence (when taken globally) does not point to a stringent long-term target, as it could be argued that small amounts of climate change may be favourable to global agricultural production. Of course, as indicated with the 'medium/low' (M/L) confidence ranking, there is still uncertainty about these conclusions. To raise confidence, agricultural impacts need to be carefully investigated to consider the effect of changes in water supply, potential increases in climate variability, changes in location of agricultural pests and diseases, and other factors. Such a large, regional research agenda Figure 5 . Sector damage relationships with increasing global mean temperature. These graphs are illustrative only, and do not attempt to fully summarize the variety of relationships that were found in this study. The results are based on global impact assessments only and do not take into account a much larger and richer literature that exists at the regional scale. Also, for some systems/sectors, few studies were available, hence the ranking of uncertainty (High, Medium, Low) associated with each sectoral assessment. No global studies exist for the following sectors/systems: recreation and tourism, transport, buildings, insurance, human amenities.
is important to informing policy in the coming decades but it is unlikely to produce results in the near term. In addition, we know that food security -the key vulnerability identified in Article 2 of the Convention -is highly dependent on non-climate factors such as socio-economic vulnerability, access to trade and food storage facilities and networks (Cannon, 2002; Fischer et al., 2002; Pingali, 2004) .
For these reasons, agriculture and food security more generally may not be the ideal 'bellweather' indicators to guide policy decisions on climate change in a post-2012 period. Nevertheless it is interesting that even in this sector, where results at lower levels of global warming are mixed if not positive globally, there is an indication of overwhelming vulnerability to negative impacts at 3-4°C of mean average warming. In comparison to agriculture, however, ecosystems and coastal zones appear to be much more sensitive to global warming at lower levels of mean change. Sector results in both of these areas appear to be robust across existing studies and to present risks even in the near term at low levels of global mean temperature change. In this case one might ask: Which levels and types of risk in these areas are acceptable and which are not? Coastal zone impacts are important because they directly affect large segments of the world population living near or in coastal areas; as such they could serve as a proxy for risk to sustainable economic development in these regions. Ecosystems are already explicitly mentioned in Article 2 and are explored briefly below to provide an example of the type of guidance that might be derived from the impacts literature for global mitigation policy. Consistent with the IPCC's five 'reasons for concern', we also briefly review recent integrated assessment literature on abrupt climate change in the search to provide guidance for the interpretation of Article 2.
Biodiversity and ecosystem effects
Studies of aggregate global biodiversity and ecosystem effects are limited and the means for measuring changes driven by climate change are not yet well established. A recent study by Leemans and Eickhout (2004) provides an aggregating methodology by using a series of different indicators of change in ecosystem categories across the world's terrestrial surface area. Global impacts on ecosystems are assessed assuming both low and moderate-to-high levels of climate change (as well as at implied rates of change). Looking across the range of indicators at different levels and rates of climate change, Leemans and Eickhout's conclusions are consistent with the findings of other analyses (Root et al., 2003; Parmesan and Yohe, 2003; Hare, 2005; Etterson and Shaw, 2001 ) and another model-based assessment of ecosystem impacts (Thomas et al., 2004) : even small levels of climate change are expected to have (or already have had) significant impacts on temperature-limited ecosystems, such as the tundra, and on diversity of species within ecosystems.
Leemans and Eickhout also conclude that risks to many regional and global ecosystems rise rapidly above a 1-2°C increase in global mean temperature (by 2100 compared with 1990 levels), mainly due to the inability of forest ecosystems to adapt to such rapid rates of temperature increase. The authors note that mitigation may be the most effective policy to limit ecosystem stresses from climate change, where every degree of avoided global mean temperature increase will yield clear benefits by limiting ecosystem disruption. Relating their assessment back to the five 'reasons of concern' identified by the IPCC, the authors propose adding another reason of concern related to adaptive capacity of regional and global ecosystem (Figure 6 ).
More detailed system-specific studies (e.g. coral reefs, arctic tundra) could provide better insights into whether system thresholds exist beyond which irreversible change will occur and of how such thresholds are linked to alternative emission pathways and mitigation strategies. It may be that climate change risks to some unique ecosystems, such as coral reefs or mountain glaciers in tropical regions, are unavoidable given the current commitment to future climate change. Here the best strategy to deal with climate change will be adaptive management strategies that aim to boost local resilience and plan for the expected changes in natural systems. Meanwhile the global and regional impact literature cited here implies that preventive or precautionary approaches -aiming to avoid significant disruption to ecosystems -would need to aim at relatively low levels of global warming (i.e. limiting mean global warming increases in this century to 1-2°C above 1990 levels, as well as limiting decadal increase to 0.1-0.2°C). Some authors have suggested that even this may lead to 'dangerous' climate change. 
Risk of abrupt change
A series of high-profile reports have recently brought attention to the risks of abrupt climate change (Alley et al., 2003; Schwartz and Randall, 2003) through low-probability, high-consequence events which have been typically left out of standard impact assessments (Schneider and Lane, 2004; Schellnhuber et al., 2004) . Abrupt climate change describes a variety of 'switch and choke' elements in the Earth's bio-geophysical systems that might be activated or deactivated by human interference with the global climate (Schellnhuber et al., 2004) . These include collapse of the Amazonian forest, instability of the West Antarctic Ice Sheet, monsoon suppression in the Tibetan Plateau, methane outbursts from permafrost melting, and breakdown of the thermohaline circulation. Analysis of the drivers and thresholds for these 'switch and choke' elements is still in its infancy; however, results from a growing number of studies suggest that accounting for irreversible, abrupt change is likely to shift the economically 'optimal' level of mitigation, calling for more investment in abatement today. Schneider and Lane (2004) argue that the harder and faster a system is disturbed, the higher is the likelihood of such abrupt events, which could be catastrophic. Similar arguments have been advanced by other experts concerned about the risk of abrupt change (e.g. O'Neill and Oppenheimer, 2002; Alley, 2004, 2005) . Among the benefits of early and stringent GHG mitigation Figure 6 . Risk to regional and global ecosystems by global mean temperature increase. Increase in global mean temperature is relative to 1990 estimates (rather than pre-industrial). The main difference between this risk area and the first bar in IPCC's 'burning embers' graph is the focus on ecosystems, whereas 'unique and threatened systems' in the IPCC graph refers both to human systems (e.g. island communities) and to specific and unique ecosystems such as coral reefs or mangroves. More work is still needed to provide a comprehensive understanding of impacts in this area, including decisions on standard metrics for monitoring change, assessing non-linear change in ecosystems and path dependency of such change (see also Schneider, 2004) as well as the economic implications of these changes (Gitay et al., 2001; Smith et al., 2001) .
Source: Leemans and Eickhout (2004) .
could be a reduction in the likelihood of such high-consequence events. This conclusion should be explored analytically; if found to be robust, it implies that rate of change of emissions or concentrations may be a useful proxy of climate change to support any long-term goal setting (O'Neill and Oppenheimer, 2004) . Most importantly, there has been little study of the consequences of abrupt events. Some, such as the breakdown of the West Antarctic Ice Sheet, would obviously be catastrophic. Others, such as the impacts of changes in the thermohaline circulation, are not so clear.
Interface between adaptation and mitigation
That some amount of climate change will be unavoidable points to the need to advance adaptation in parallel with accelerated mitigation. Adaptation will require taking projections of medium-term climate change into account in some regions in the planning in infrastructure projects and, more generally, in natural resource management decisions (OECD, 2003a (OECD, -d, 2004a .
A recent OECD case study on Nepal demonstrates the close connections between water resource management and energy production and climate change in a development planning context (Agrawala et al., 2003) . Nepal is currently experiencing rapid retreat of the Himalayan glaciers, which has been linked to a trend in rising temperatures (Richardson and Reynolds, 2000; Shrestha and Shrestha, 2004 ). There has also been an increase in the volumes of glacial lakes, increasing this risk of glacial lake outburst floods (GLOFs). GLOFs may release huge volumes of water that can wipe out any infrastructure and villages that may be in their path. One event of this type in 1985 wiped out a multimillion-dollar hydropower dam that had only recently been constructed; other events have damaged or destroyed roads and villages, adversely affecting the livelihoods of local people. The risk of such events and of glacier retreat more generally alters the water and the energy (hydropower) outlook for the region affected as a whole, and has implications for infrastructure planning and projects (Agrawala et al., 2003; OECD, 2003c) .
This example demonstrates the need for a combination of local/regional adaptation and international mitigation strategies to effectively manage regional climate change in high-risk areas. It also demonstrates how impact assessment can point to the limits of mitigation in some areas and to the need for urgent attention to adaptation to address impacts that are unavoidable in future decades, given the known atmospheric changes already locked into the Earth's system.
Impacts-based policymaking: lessons from Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution
Relevant lessons about the use of long-term goals to guide multilateral environmental agreements may exist under other agreements, and the Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution (LRTAP) is considered here as one example where scientific information on impacts is used to guide policy decisions (Semb, 2002; Levy, 1993) . LRTAP surveys a wide range of pollutants and is organized to generate and share new knowledge on the transboundary environmental effects of these pollutants as well as to manage and limit these effects. The LRTAP process has successfully raised concern and awareness among participating and observer nations about the hazardous environmental effects of acidic pollutants. 19 This has occurred through a 'Working Party on Effects' and the establishment of several (voluntary) international collaborative programmes, which share research on a variety of different receptors of the pollutants. For example, separate programmes exist to study effects on forests, materials, freshwaters and crops. Working in combination with an extensive emissions monitoring programme (EMEP), LRTAP's collaborative approach to developing and sharing knowledge has helped to shape international consensus on the need for political action and to shift a number of initially sceptical or laggard nations to adopt policies designed to curb acid rain (Levy, 2001) .
LRTAP has also developed the notion of 'critical loads' to guide decisions on specific multilateral emission limits (Semb, 2002; Levy, 1993) . Critical loads define the highest amount of deposition of a pollutant that species or soils can tolerate without changing the ecosystem in an 'unacceptable' way. Though initially resisted, the notion of critical loads for acidic deposition is used by the signatories to this Convention to monitor progress and as an input for decisions on future emission mitigation commitments.
Given both the complexity of the science and its importance to social understandings of climate change and the policy process, future UNFCCC negotiations might be strengthened through an improved science-policy dialogue on post-2012 mitigation options. For example, a useful initiative would be to establish a setting where scientific researchers could usefully interact with, brief and advise international policymakers to inform the debate about the climate change effects of alternative mitigation strategies in the long term. Social scientists might also comprise part of this effort, advising on knowledge about social understandings of climate change. Establishing such an institutional mechanism on a permanent basis would take time but could be instrumental to raising awareness among the policy community, and the participating civil society and business groups, about available expert knowledge. Of course the expert community cannot be expected to pass judgement on what types of risk are politically and socially acceptable. That is the job of politicians -in this case the international negotiators. Nevertheless, by outlining information about the nature of climate change risks, the scientific and expert community can frame the problem in such a way as to help policymakers to interpret Article 2 in an iterative and flexible manner, through incremental decisions across time, building on new knowledge about scientific and social perspectives on climate change risk.
Building new coalitions to limit climate change
Inevitably the challenge for negotiators is to build new coalitions that support mitigating climate change and its impacts. Negotiations over the last half a decade have deadlocked due to conflicting interests among diverse participants. In a world characterized by increasingly open trade and investment patterns, and a rise in the influence of the private sector (compared with government), successfully addressing climate change requires governments to establish clear and timely incentives for industry to innovate in order to protect the environment. Delay in providing these incentives can only delay necessary innovation. The limited political will in the international community to broadly regulate GHG emissions among all major emitters indicates a fundamental failure to understand the risk of inaction -that is, the risks of allowing climate change to proceed unabated.
New coalitions could emerge among those nations that have a common interest to limit climate change impacts within this century to avoid risk to natural and socio-economic systems that are vital to local and regional livelihoods (see Figure 7) . AOSIS is already such a coalition, but sentiment in these more vulnerable island nations may be joined increasingly by other nations, including those from the 'North', that are also threatened by sea-level rise or other changes in regional climates. This perspective contrasts with that sometimes advocated by others as a way forward -e.g. focusing on the 'large-emitting' countries and allowing them to negotiate the next set of commitments among themselves. If one adds the coalition of highly vulnerable nations to the core negotiating group, the issue of stringency, pathways and upper limits for near-term commitments, such that long-term goals may be achieved, will inevitably be part of the discussion. On the other hand, if the negotiations were to proceed among the largest emitters only, the impact or climate system effects of mitigation decisions could be largely ignored, with the focus remaining on the cost of mitigation alone.
We argue that both perspectives are needed, calling for a combination of highly vulnerable and high-emitting nations to be fully engaged in post-2012 negotiations. The highly vulnerable nations are needed, at least at the outset of such a negotiation, to influence the ambition level or stringency of any near-to medium-term obligations. If there is convergence among the highly vulnerable and high-emitting nations on the global level of ambition of a post-2012 set of commitments, then large emitters might be designated to take over the remaining issues in the negotiations, e.g. to work out the details for the remaining architecture of the agreement.
Underlying this agenda is the need to build the capacity of negotiators to understand the connections between emissions, mitigation, and impacts outcomes. Such capacity could be boosted by a wider understanding and greater public awareness that could be developed through 'bottomup' regional assessments of critical impact areas (e.g. of ecosystems vulnerable to climate change) and stakeholder dialogues about thresholds or upper bounds for 'acceptable' change. Coral reefs and Arctic ecosystems, and follow-on impacts on human systems, have been cited here as examples of climate-sensitive systems that might benefit from such a bottom-up assessment to better understand the potential for avoided impact benefits of mitigation. Regional assessment combined with stakeholder dialogues might also prove valuable to spread awareness and understanding of both mitigation and adaptation options in heavily populated coastal zones (e.g. S-E Asia, the Mediterranean basin, the Florida Keys) and regions dependent upon water resources from snowfall and glaciers in high altitude mountain systems (e.g. the Alps, the Rocky Mountains, the Himalayas).
Implications for post-2012 negotiations
What does an average 2°C warmer world look like compared to a 3°C world, or a 4°C world for that matter? These would seem to be central questions if we are to press for any particular longterm atmospheric concentration target, many of which could suggest stringent and quite radical emission reductions and transformation of our energy economies in the coming decades.
We argue for the use of global goal-setting -based on careful assessment of the long-term impacts of different mitigation goals -as part of post-2012 climate change negotiations. Even a conservative interpretation of the climate change impacts literature, taking into account aggregate global impacts alone, suggests that 3-4°C of global mean temperature increase above 1990 levels by 2100 may be a threshold beyond which all known sector impacts across all regions are negative and rising with increasing levels of warming. Below this, at a global mean temperature increase of 1-2°C by 2100, significant and irreversible changes in ecosystems are predicted, especially if warming occurs at a rapid rate, limiting the ability of ecosystems to adapt naturally. Thus a precautionary policy might aim for significantly lower levels and slower rates of global warming.
The exact level of any long-term goals may be less important to negotiations than discussion of such goals and their implications for regional impacts. Any convergence towards agreement on an upper limit in the long term would indicate upper bounds for nearer-term emissions. The aim of related policy decisions would be to constrain emission pathways such that they leave open the possibility to achieve loosely agreed long-term goals or 'soft targets'. Goal-setting at the outset of negotiations on next steps under the Convention can help to develop a shared understanding of desired outcomes for policies, and upper bounds for global emissions in the nearer term.
Lessons and linkages with international air pollution policy initiatives may point a way forward for climate change. The LRTAP provides an example of international environmental policy driven by the notion of avoided impacts through the use of the critical loads concept. Effects-based international collaborative research and science policy dialogue, as used under LRTAP, offers one model that could be explored to support reflection on long-term mitigation strategies under the UNFCCC.
Taking Article 2 as central to decisions on next steps could raise awareness within the political process about effects of climate change and its linkages to mitigation in the coming decades. Focusing on climate change effects might also lead to new coalitions of partners (Figure 7) . Without a broad focus on environmental effects, ad hoc incrementalism may reign, as in the past, to significantly limit the level of ambition and scope of participation in post-2012 mitigation commitments. It is unlikely that basic research in the impacts field will yield new specific results in time to shape decisions on next steps. Nevertheless, raising awareness about what we already know may help to mobilize support for action in developing and developed countries, among policymakers and the general public. It follows that it would also be timely for negotiators to consider the implications of different mitigation strategies for a variety of impact outcomes, in key areas and in different time frames, and to use this understanding to inform their decisions on the architecture for future commitments.
1 The Article 2 objective of the Convention is: 'to achieve … stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system. Such a level should be achieved within a time-frame sufficient to allow ecosystems to adapt naturally to climate change; to ensure that food production is not threatened and to enable economic development to proceed in a sustainable manner.' 2 The IPCC was asked to address Article 2 in the Synthesis of its Third Assessment Report; however, their response notes that 'scientific evidence helps to reduce uncertainty and increase knowledge…' but that 'decisions are value-judgements determined through socio-political processes…' (IPCC, 2001a, p. 38 To help inform these negotiations, the UNFCCC Secretariat has held several workshops featuring recent information on impact assessments (see http://www.unfccc.int -workshop information). These discussions were not, however, related to questions about mitigation commitments. 4 One exception in the international negotiations on compensation that is linked to Article 4.8 of the Convention. This Article foresees actions [by Parties] to meet the special needs and concerns of developing country Parties arising from adverse effects of climate change. To help inform these negotiations, the UNFCCC Secretariat has held several workshops featuring recent information on impact assessments (see http://www.unfccc.int -workshop information). Meanwhile several national governments have made hortatory statements about long-term objectives for climate policies, for example the Netherlands, and more recently Germany, and the EU has formally adopted a view that global mean temperature increase (above preindustrial levels) should not exceed 2°C. 5 The Nordhaus and Boyer (2000) work includes limited treatment of amenity values and abrupt climate change. Several other exercises have shown that vastly different results can be had by manipulating the way in which abrupt change is characterized (Azar and Lindgren, 2003; Mastrandrea and Schneider, 2004) . 6 Nordhaus and Boyer (2000, p.98 ) also draw a similar conclusion. 7 Note, global mean temperature (GMT) increase can refer to a number of different base year(s) or periods. At least three different reference points can be found in the literature: GMT increase (i) compared to pre-industrial temperature change; (ii) compared to multi-decade period -1960/70 -1990; and (iii) compared to 1990 . Given that pre-industrial temperatures are estimated to be 0.6°C lower than they are today, there is about a half a degree difference between options (i) and (ii) or (iii). Even this relatively 'small' difference could have significant implications for mitigation strategies. Unless otherwise noted, this paper refers the base period of 1990, which is consistent with much of the impacts literature cited here and reviewed in the Hitz and Smith paper (2004) and with the IPCC's treatment of this issue in the Third Assessment Report. 8 GMT increase serves as a proxy to discuss climate change impacts that occur at particular levels of atmospheric carbon concentrations (parts per million), but often this is a simplification. GMT also depends on factors other than carbon concentrations including: sulphate levels and the magnitude of their (negative) forcing, the climate sensitivity of the Earth in response to greenhouse gas build-up, the concentration of non-carbon greenhouse gases (e.g. methane, HFC, PFC and SF 6 ), and carbon uptake by oceans and other sinks. Because of these other factors, the strong positive correlation between atmospheric carbon concentrations and global mean temperature may or may not be linear. GMT is a good proxy for Article 2 discussions because it includes these other factors of climate change. However, for a given increase in GMT, there can be vast regional disparities in temperature, precipitation patterns, and climate variability. However, the more 'disaggregated' the climate indicators (i.e. going from global to regional changes in climate), the more difficult it is to relate changes in GHG concentrations to climate outcomes. 9 It should be noted that broadening of sensitivity ranges, e.g. from Andronova and Schlesinger (2001) and Stainworth et al. (2005) , make this more challenging. The statement assumes that we have confidence in the range of potential outcomes. 10 See also , Mastrandrea and Schneider (2004) and Wigley (2004) . 11 Note that Figures 3 and 4 are not directly comparable, as they were derived from different models and prior assumptions. The former represents stabilization of atmospheric CO 2 concentrations, and is based on Monte Carlo analysis and uniform distribution of key parameters; whereas the latter shows stabilization of GHG for two particular emission scenarios, based on observations and expert elicitation, and non-uniform probability distributions. They are shown here to demonstrate two different ways of using probabilistic assessment of climate change outcomes as related to possible long-term objectives. 12 Nevertheless, a range of other authors have also suggested focusing on key vulnerabilities or impacts to climate change to inform global policy decisions (Pittock et al., 2001; Jones, 2004; Mastrandrea and Schneider, 2004; Jacoby, 2004; Patwardhan et al., 2003; Hare and Meinshausen, 2004; ECF and PIK, 2004; ICCT, 2005; UK Defra, 2005) . 13 See , Jones (2004 Jones ( , 2001 and Jaeger (1998) . 14 Examples of stakeholder engagement in impact assessment include the UK Climate Impacts Programme (ongoing) and USGCRP (2000), although neither of these address linkages to mitigation strategies. In two recent scientific meetings, UK Defra (2005) and ECF and PIK (2004) , scientific experts and other stakeholders have been asked to reflect on interpretations of 'dangerous' climate change either on a regional or global basis. Also, since 1996, the European Union has had political consensus on the need to limit climate change to 2°C above pre-industrial levels (see EU, 2004 EU, , 2005 . Their deliberations have included a general review of available impact information as well as information on the costs of mitigation. 15 Looking back, Yamin and Depledge (2004) discuss this with respect to negotiations (and negotiators) on the Protocol and the Convention. 16 In addition, the carbon fertilization effect saturates at higher CO 2 concentrations. Beyond roughly 600-800 ppm, there is little or no additional benefit to adding CO 2 . Moreover, the higher CO 2 levels result in greater climate change, placing more stress on plants and ecosystems (Rosenzweig and Hillel, 1998) . 17 For example, Hare (2005) finds that a 2°C increase in GMT above pre-industrial levels may already lead to potentially large extinctions or ecosystem collapses. See also ACIA (2004) for an understanding of regional risks of global climate change in the Arctic. In addition, while we refer here to 2°C as 'low' levels of change, Azar and Rodhe (1997) have pointed out that this is roughly double the increase experienced in the previous millennium occurring in a single century. 18 This issue is addressed in Schneider (2004) as well as in Narain and Fisher (2000) , Baranzini et al. (2003) , Schneider (2001, 2004) , Yohe (2003; based on Roughgarden and Schneider, 1999) and Azar and Lindgren (2003) . Nordhaus and Boyer (2000) also include what they call 'catastrophic' change and a limited set of natural system amenities, though they ignore other non-market impacts including irreversible ecosystem effects; contrary to the other studies noted above, they conclude that these events make no difference to the timing of abatement (though it might raise the costs in the distant future). 19 More recently, LRTAP has extended its reach to persistent organic pollutants -but since this experience is quite recent, the focus here is on acid rain.
